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Abstract 
 
The debate on globalization has long been characterized by theses of institutional convergence 
and divergence. The emergence of Anglo-Saxon shareholder capitalism as the dominant 
paradigm since the start of the 1990s is associated with the pursuit of global strategies by 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and the consolidation of a multilateral trade regime. Yet the 
link between actual MNE strategies and developments in the institutional arena remains an 
understudied phenomenon. Tensions between multiple levels of institution building – 
unilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism – create an environment of strategic uncertainty 
for MNEss. Consequently, MNEs’ actual international strategies reveal much about perceptions 
of the institutional environment in which they operate and allows for the documentation of more 
subtle paradigm shifts. The internationalization strategies pursued by MNEs from the Triad over 
the 1990s reveal that a multilateral strategic reality was anticipated by only an elite few, while 
the vast majority of firms operated in a unilaterally- or at best regionally-determined institutional 
environment. This contribution suggests that institutional restructuring is multifaceted and 
sometimes contradictory, casting a new and more subtle light on the globalization debate.  
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Introduction 
 
The debate on the nature and significance of ‘globalization’ – indeed whether it exists at all – has 
centered largely on the discussion of an emerging paradigm of convergent institutional 
development (Radice, 2000). Traditionally the literature on globalization has been classified as 
‘globalizationist’ (Ohmae, 1990; Reich, 1991; Levitt, 1983) or ‘skeptical’ (Wade, 1996; Boyer 
and Drache, 1996; Hirst and Thomson, 1996). The debate is strongly driven by concerns that 
globalization amounts de facto to the rise and diffusion of Anglo-Saxon liberalism on a global 
scale in the form of large public Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) embracing the shareholder 
model of capitalism as the preferred institutional environment (Hay, 2004).  
As drivers of international restructuring, MNEs are rightfully positioned at the heart of 
the ‘globalization’ debate. Yet the underlying relationship between (perceptions of) institutional 
development and the international strategies of MNEs has thus far been relatively understudied, 
with relatively few exceptions (Holman and van der Pijl, 1996; Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995; 
Hirst and Thomson, 1996). While some authors pay particular attention to the non-market aspect 
of firm strategy in building institutions (Baron, 2000; Cowles, 1995; Greenwood, 1997), the role 
of market strategy has been addressed to some extent in the literature on business-government 
relations, e.g. the literature on the ‘obsolescing bargain’ (Vernon, 1971; Kobrin, 1987). This 
emphasis on firms has been even more developed in the International Business literature on e.g. 
‘flagship firms’ (Rugman and D’Cruz, 2000) and ‘leader firms’ (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 
1995). Taken together these bodies of literature show that governments and large companies are 
the two main actors in institutional change (Vernon, 1994).  
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Much of the management literature that emerged concurrent with the International 
Relations literature on ‘globalization’ and ‘convergence’ in the 1980s and early 1990s was 
characterized by an emphasis on global strategies (Porter, 1986; Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Bartlett 
and Ghoshal, 1989; Ohmae, 1990; Dekker, 1991). By the mid-1990s studies were beginning to 
emerge that tempered the focus on ‘global’, highlighting the viability of alternate strategies 
(Rugman, 2000; Schlie and Yip, 2000). This view was also rooted in empirically founded 
suggestions of the existence of an ‘internationalization threshold’ and the risk of overstretch 
(Geringer et al., 1989) with respect to the performance implications of MNE internationalization. 
More recent studies even argue that the center of gravity in institutional development as well as 
the strategies of firms is in fact found at the supra-national regional level (Rugman and Verbeke, 
2004; Delios and Beamish, 2005).  
The uncertainty in strategy thinking is mirrored by uncertainty in companies’ institutional 
environments. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was heralded by many as the beginning of the 
era of globalization and the supremacy of multilateral institutions with a free-market agenda. 
Instead, the fifteen years following 1989 turned out to be much more convoluted. In the 1990s, 
business leaders were generally strong proponents of the ‘globalization’ trend, but in practice 
have also been actively engaged in supporting initiatives to establish and/or strengthen regional 
integration initiatives, even with divergent visions of how regional integration should develop 
(van Apeldoorn, 2002). Rather than unequivocal support for the multilateral institutions that 
would reinforce globalization, a strange institutional mixture of multilateralism, regionalism and 
unilateralism has therefore developed, with each representing different, and potentially 
conflicting, visions of global economic restructuring. This institutional mixture has thus also sent 
mixed signals to managers on how to organize their activities.  
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The viability of institutional arrangements is rooted in the support it receives from societal actors 
– in this case particularly governments and multinational firms. How did MNEs respond to this 
international institutional ambiguity in their internationalization strategies and what does this 
reveal as to the viability of the chosen arrangements? Is a domestic strategy still viable for major 
players in today’s economy? Did companies have global orientations, regional ones or some 
combination thereof?? Business is confronted with the question of how to develop sophisticated 
general strategies during uncertain circumstances; for policymakers, the question remains how 
business assesses the institutional environment and adapts strategy accordingly.  
This paper first explores further the link between institution building and the internationalization 
strategies of MNEs at a conceptual level. Next we develop a typology of international strategies 
and discuss briefly some of the strategic issues that arise under different institutional 
frameworks. Finally, we look at the actual strategies adopted by a set of the world’s largest 
companies from the United States, Europe and Japan (the Triad) for the 1990-2001 period in 
which most of the international institutional changes materialized. This part considers the 
consequences and implications of those strategies for firm performance as well as for the global 
institutional context. 
 
The emergence of uncertainty: tension between institutional layers 
Studying the relationship between institutional uncertainty and company strategies, 
represents a classic ‘level-of-analysis’ problem. Three ‘layers’ can be distinguished in the 
institutional environment that companies face. At the highest level, the ‘multilateral layer’ is 
embodied by the move towards a ‘global’ system and convergence in global economic and 
political institutions. World trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows relative to world 
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GDP have been on the rise, along with cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
(UNCTAD, 1999). At the same time, the world’s foremost multilateral institution in the realm of 
the global economic system, the World Trade Organization (WTO), has grown from 123 
members in 1989 to 148 members in 2005. Even so, WTO negotiations have stalled amidst a rain 
of public protest and shifting balances of power within the WTO itself. Multilateral institutions 
in other areas, such as the Kyoto protocol on greenhouse gas emissions and the OECD’s 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) have run aground, indicating that the multilateral 
system may be losing steam.  
Meanwhile the ‘regional layer’ of institution building seems increasingly to represent 
the fast track of international restructuring. The number of Regional Integration Agreements 
(RIAs) in the world has exploded in recent years, rising from fewer than 50 in 1990 to more than 
150 in 2004, with considerable uncertainty as to whether regionalism is a ‘building block’ or a 
stumbling block’ to further multilateralism (Bergsten, 1997). Although in principle the WTO 
does not allow for RIAs that raise barriers to trade, in practice RIAs like the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) are fraught with exemptions 
such that most do not even approach anything like ‘free’ trade (Globerman, 1994) or the 
unrestricted movement of factors of production.  
At the same time, the ‘unilateral layer’ continues to exist as well. Many states continue 
to take a unilateralist approach to the international institutional environment, either in the form of 
outright unilateralism, demonstrated by countries such as North Korea and Iran, to more hidden 
forms of unilateralism pursued by individual states in either the multilateral or the regional 
context, characterized for instance by a preference for individually established bilateral trade 
agreements or a reluctance to submit to multilateral agreements (cf. Lung and van Tulder, 2004). 
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Examples of this underlying form of unilateralism are e.g. the United States’ venture into Iraq, its 
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and its current approach to trade 
relations with Latin America; Norway’s reluctance to join the European Union; the UK’s 
continued aversion to the Euro; or the popular rejection of the EU constitution by France and the 
Netherlands in 2005. These developments support the view of Whitley and Christensen (1996) 
and van der Pijl (1992) who argue that national institutions and interests – and hence 
‘unilateralism’ – will not be erased by integration. 
The strategic uncertainties posed by these multiple and shifting layers of the institutional 
environment center on how fragmented or cohesive the emergent environment will be. Would 
multilateralism be the dominant track for international restructuring? If so, will it be far-reaching 
and balanced, or continue to be ad hoc and heavily contested? Similarly, it remains uncertain 
how regionalism will continue to develop as a ‘fast track’ of international restructuring, not only 
in terms of policy harmonization and cooperation (‘depth’), but also in terms of market access, 
mobility of production factors and membership (‘openness’). Will integration be primarily 
‘negative’ (consisting of dismantling institutions such as trade barriers) or ‘positive’ (building 
institutions able to deal with e.g. macroeconomic risks and reduced national policy latitude, as in 
the case of the Stability Pact in Europe)? Will regionalism develop in multiple locations in an 
atmosphere of conflict, or will regions develop parallel to a strong multilateral system such that 
the two are mutually reinforcing (‘parallel regional-multilateralism’)? And finally, as a 
consequence, it remains unclear whether and to what extent individual states will be a major 
source of unilateral institution-building in the 21st century.  
These potentially divergent institutional developments at the multilateral, regional and 
unilateral level create push and pull forces that influence the geographic dispersion of firms. By 
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considering the de facto strategies pursued by firms from 1990 onwards, insight can be gained 
into the shifting balance between layers of institutional development and their interplay with firm 
strategies, also leading to improved understanding of the multifaceted outlook of what is often 
too casually referred to as ‘globalization’. 
 
Institutional restructuring and MNE internationalization strategies  
The relevance and potential impact of institutional uncertainty for firms depends largely 
on actual (as opposed to intended) firms’ strategies (cf. Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995). The 
relevant period to study is the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which 
heralded the beginning of the end of the Cold War, but also showed the greatest international 
institutional uncertainty. The key characteristic of firms’ strategies is their actual 
internationalization strategies in the subsequent period. International strategy reflects not only 
the overall degree of firm internationalization (DOI), but also the geographic scope of that 
internationalization. In practice, both vary considerably. Despite much of the attention for 
‘global’ strategies, it is increasingly accepted even today that the vast majority of Fortune 500 
firms, have regional, if not domestic, orientations (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004). Many cases of 
the latter can be found e.g. among leading American retailers, while at the other extreme, firms 
such as Nestlé and Philips may generate more than 95 percent of their sales outside their 
respective home countries. In between the (home) regional geographic scope and the global 
scope, various levels of geographic orientation have been identified ranging from ‘host regional’ 
to ‘bi-regional’ (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004) and ‘Triadic’ or even ‘quadratic’  (Delios and 
Beamish, 2005).  
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In exploring firm strategies, we concentrate on a sample of the largest Fortune 500 non-
financial firms from the Triad. We documented the geographic dispersion of firm assets across 
Triad regions. The internationalization of assets of non-financial firms is a better and more stable 
indicator of internationalization than either the internationalization of sales or employment (cf. 
UNCTAD, 1999). The geographic dispersion of assets is also related to the growth of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), which is considered a better indicator of ‘globalization’ than for 
instance the growth of international trade. For Triad-based Fortune Global 500 firms, five 
general levels of geographic scope could be distinguished in the base year 1990: domestic; 
(home) regional; bi-regional; semi-global and global (Table 1). A domestic orientation means 
that virtually all goods are produced within the home country borders. In practical terms, some of 
this production may be exported as final goods or for final assembly in foreign markets but the 
home market will continue to account for at least 75 percent of total sales. A domestic 
orientation may be rooted in sufficient home-market size, home market protection, or in 
strategically sensitive sectors such as defense or aerospace.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Home region strategies tend to have their roots in strong domestic positions and 
incremental internationalization. Although firms with a home-region focus often have an extra-
regional dimension to their international strategies, this reflects in practice no more than ten to 25 
percent of overall activity. Regional strategies are based on the exploitation of activities in 
countries inside the home region by virtue of their low geographic, economic, administrative and 
cultural distance (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Ghemawat, 2003), often entailing some regional 
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division of labor. These relatively low forms of distance reduce transaction costs and allow for 
improved exploitation of scale economies through e.g. platform strategies while keeping the 
‘liability of foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995) manageable. Car companies such as Chrysler, Fiat and 
Peugeot were key examples of firms pursuing a regional integrated strategy in 1990.  
Bi-regional strategies are those by which production and consumption are more or less 
evenly split across the home region and one primary host region. Such strategies have 
traditionally been confined nearly exclusively to the ‘dyad’ of North America and Europe and 
are one of the anchors of ‘trans-Atlanticism’. Firms with a bi-regional orientation generally have 
a long history in both regions that often pre-dates World War Two. Bi-regional strategies are 
linked to market size, synergies in consumption patterns and living standards, or similarities in 
technologies and tastes. Bi-regional strategies in 1990 could be seen in e.g. food and retail (e.g. 
Ahold, Franz Haniel and Sara Lee) and the chemical and electronics industries (e.g. Dow 
Chemical, Du Pont, IBM and Compaq).  
A semi-global strategy exists when a firm’s home region continues to account for about 
50 percent of the firm’s activities, while the remaining 50 percent is spread more or less evenly 
over at least the remaining two Triad regions. In practice strategies of this type reflect firms from 
North America or Europe with a bi-regional orientation that had expanded into Asia to generate 
production of intermediate and final goods for markets in North America and Europe. Firms in 
this context in 1990 were e.g. Philips, Motorola, Hewlett Packard and Imperial Chemical 
Industries.  
Global strategies are reflected de facto in a relatively even spread of production across 
the three Triad regions of North America, Europe and Asia. Despite the emphasis in the 
management literature at the time, only very few firms pursued true global strategies in 1990, 
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concentrated in two industrial clusters. A small number of global firms could be found on the 
one hand in fast-moving consumer goods (Nestlé, Unilever, Coca-Cola and British American 
Tobacco) and on the other hand in petroleum extraction and refining (Exxon, Royal Dutch Shell, 
British Petroleum and Mobil) or related industries (British Thermoplastics and Rubber).  
 
Issues of emergent strategic uncertainty: the search for synergy 
Over time, there is an interplay between a firm’s geographic scope and the institutional 
environment in which the firm operates. The different levels of institutions can be juxtaposed 
against the various levels of firm geographic scope to show how a lack of synergy between the 
two can generate expansionary or contractionary pressures on firms (Figure 1). When a firm’s 
geographic scope largely reflects the predominant level of instutitional development to which the 
firm is exposed, the institutional environment and the firm’s international strategy are said to be 
in synergy. For instance, in a world in which regional-level integration processes predominate, 
the development of a predominantly regional orientation will mitigate unnecessary risks that 
might otherwise exist if the firm had a solely domestic orientation. In turn, in a multilaterally-
determined global system, (semi)global firms face relatively low levels of uncertainty in their 
operating environment due to the transparency and relative homogeneity of supranational 
institutions. A predominance of global institutions will facilitate strategies of a broad geographic 
scope, while the fragmentary nature of institutions driven by national interests will discourage 
strategies of a broad geographic scope.  
 
FIGURE 1 
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As the institutional environment changes over time, these changes will exert pressures on 
firms depending on their geographic scope. For example, globally-oriented firms will have 
optimal latitude in arranging and coordinating their operations under a consolidated multilateral 
system. If, however, the emphasis in institution-building shifts from the multilateral level to the 
regional level, tensions at the institutional level can put strains on the firm’s ability to manage its 
global strategy. As individual regions such as the European Union (EU) or North America under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) pursue their own respective policy 
agendas, the chance of cross-regional harmonization decreases relative to the case of an 
(anticipated) single, multilateral system. This creates tension within firms that span multiple 
regions. That tension can translate into contractionary pressures, by which the firm may best be 
served by increasing regional-level autonomy within the organization or even reducing the 
geographic scope of its operations. On the other hand, firms that have developed solid domestic 
strategies in an environment of unilaterally determined national markets are exposed to 
expansionary pressures if the unilateral approach is abandoned for a regional or multilateral track 
of institutional development.  
Table 2 addresses some of the key strategic issues that arise through institutional 
uncertainty given the way different firms had organized their activities spatially in 1990. 
Domestic firms, for instance, are faced with uncertainty as to whether and how to manage a 
transition from a relatively manageable national environment to a regional or even global 
competitive space. Such firms see the potential for greater global reach, but are anxious to 
protect their home-market positions. On the other hand, domestic firms (e.g. Japanese carmakers) 
may equally be concerned with the prospect of being locked out of third-party regions, as in the 
case of ‘Fortress Europe’.  
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TABLE 2 HERE 
 
For regionally oriented firms, regional integration processes in the home region were 
expected to increase competition levels within the region, forcing firms to choose between 
regional entrenchment strategies or a risk reduction strategy based on geographic dispersion 
outside the region. In contrast, bi-regional firms were faced with the possibility of increased 
strategic complexity as a result of regional integration in both the home region and the host 
region (i.e., North America and Europe or vice versa). Regionalism in both regions creates a 
threat of institutional divergence between the two that leads to bifurcating gravitational pull and 
the risk of ‘overstretch’, necessitating a strategy of contraction. On the other hand, multilateral 
institution-building could smooth out this process and facilitate further expansion. 
For semi-global strategies, a multilateral solution could be expected to facilitate further 
expansion and the possibility of a true global spread. Yet the gravitational pull of regional 
integration could jeopardize a thinly spread strategy by increasing the costs of doing business 
across regions. Similarly, a global strategy could profit from a multilateral regime conducive to 
easy market penetration, while institutional divergence through regionalism (or unilateralism) 
could at the same time increase the tension between a firm’s need to aggregate in order to exploit 
scale and local responsiveness pressures by de facto increasing the institutional distance between 
regions and /or countries (cf. Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).  
 
Strategic migrations between multilateralism, regionalism and unilateralism 
The multiple layers of institutions, and the uncertainty that surrounds them, are relevant in 
different ways to firms with different patterns of internationalization. A firm’s pre-existing 
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internationalization pattern is instrumental in shaping its strategic response to the prevailing 
institutional framework. Figure 2 provides a number of indicative examples of the way 
contractionary and expansionary pressures can affect a firm’s internationalization strategy under 
different circumstances. In the figure, pressures to expand or contract are broken down into two 
components: inside the home region and outside the home region. For example, if regionalism 
emerges as the prevailing institutional framework, this will exert contractionary pressures on 
(semi-)global MNEs both inside and outside their home regions (1). On the other hand, 
regionalism will generate expansionary pressures for domestically oriented firms (5). In contrast, 
regionally oriented firms will be faced with contractionary pressures in the case of unilateralism 
(2), and so on. Below these ideal-type migrations will be compared to the actual strategic 
migrations of large firms from the Triad to substantiate which pressures dominated for which 
kinds of firms, and thus which institutional layers formed the basis of firm strategic realities over 
the 1990s. 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Japanese strategies: responding to regionalism on the outside 
In 1990, the average domestic share of company assets for the 60 largest Japanese firms 
was well over 90 percent. Most of the large well-known trading/manufacturing companies such 
as Mitsubishi, Marubeni and Mitsui were primarily domestic in their orientation, pursuing at best 
a limited export strategy. Others, such as Honda and to a lesser extent Toyota, pursued a 
peripheral domestic strategy based on assembly operations on the North American and European 
continents (cf. Carillo et al., 2004). Only Sony had well-established international production at 
that point, with a bi-regional integrated strategy spanning Asia and North America as well as a 
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growing presence in Europe. These low levels of internationalization can be attributed to cultural 
factors (discussed elsewhere, cf. Whitley, 1999; Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995), the choice for a 
particular trade and industrial policy, and the legacy of Japan’s defeat in World War Two. 
Since 1990, the strategies of Japanese firms have been shaped by the political choices of 
their government not to engage in any formal and deep regional integration initiative and to 
maintain a home economy that is fairly closed from the outside in (although export-oriented). 
This, coupled with the economic malaise that gripped Japan throughout the 1990s, led to two 
major strategic imperatives for Japanese companies in the 1990s. First, Japanese companies were 
motivated to develop and preserve a sphere of influence in Asia, fueled by the Newly 
Industrializing Economies (NIEs) and increased de facto regional integration under the auspices 
of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Secondly, the threat of exclusion from 
the North American market as a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and from the European market as a result of the Single European Market (SEM) necessitated an 
‘outside-in’ internationalization thrust in both those regions. In the case of both imperatives, 
Japanese companies were faced with institutional developments that were largely out of their 
own hands, largely as a result of their pre-existing low levels of internationalization of 
production. The various forms of economic retaliation imposed upon Japan by Europe and the 
USA in particular – from the Plaza agreement which negatively changed the Yen-Dollar ratio to 
the imposition of ‘voluntary’ export quota – had effectively ‘contained’ Japan, which 
consequently experienced a prolonged period of economic stagnation throughout the 1990s (van 
Tulder, 2004). 
By 2001, only a small number of firms had succeeded in building a solid international 
portfolio of production locations. Companies such as Honda, Bridgestone, Toyota and Nissan 
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had developed solid bi-regional integrated strategies spanning Asia and North America in order 
to cater to the local content requirements for automobiles under the NAFTA. Other firms, like 
Mitsui and Mitsubishi, had developed modest toeholds in North America and Europe but 
remained within the context of their overall domestic orientation. The vast majority of Japanese 
firms retained a domestic or – at best – regional character throughout the period. In addition to 
the cultural and macro-economic aspects that shaped Japanese strategies, this can be seen as the 
result of a limited ability on the part of Japanese firms to influence institution-building, and 
therefore to manage institutional uncertainty. By not playing the international institution-building 
game, Japanese firms were put at a disadvantage. They found themselves fighting for market 
access in North America and Europe, two regions undergoing institutional transformations in the 
1990s from which most Japanese firms were geographically too far removed to be able to shape 
substantially. In the end the Japanese state pursued only a very modest internationalization 
strategy, one mirrored by the majority of the largest Japanese firms. 
 
European strategies: banking on parallel regional-multilateralism 
In 1990, the largest European firms had on average two-thirds of their assets located in 
the home country, and in total four-fifths located in Europe. Fifteen firms were primarily 
domestically oriented (e.g. Tesco, Metro and Karstadt), and another 29 firms showed varying 
degrees of regional orientation (e.g. Peugeot, Thyssen, Preussag, BMW and Danone). Four of the 
European firms were bi-regional in 1990 (e.g. Ahold and Rhone-Poulenc) and another four were 
semi-global (e.g. Electrolux and Philips), while only six firms qualified as global (e.g. BP, 
Unilever and Nestlé). The fact that 41 out of the 62 largest European firms (66 percent) had at 
best a regional orientation in 1990 underscores the strategic significance of regional integration 
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at that time. It has been argued elsewhere that European firms with different international 
orientations had very different attitudes towards European integration (van Apeldoorn, 2002; 
Holman and van der Pijl, 1996). Those attitudes can largely be traced back to the strategic issues 
addressed above.  
The move away from a predominantly nationally-organized business environment to one 
of deepening regional integration exerted pressure on domestically oriented firms to expand their 
geographic scope. Primarily, that expansion was targeted at the rest of Europe. However, the 
subsequent prospect of a region-wide shakeout due to enhanced regional competition induced 
domestically oriented firms to expand outside Europe as well. This process was in turn facilitated 
by a strong belief in Europe in the multilateral process, in the form of the GATT’s 1995 
transformation into the WTO. This expectation of parallel regional multilateralism on the part of 
European countries, and on the part of European companies, also facilitated extra-regional 
expansion by firms with a pre-existing regional strategy. In many cases, regionally oriented firms 
complemented extra-regional expansion strategies by also expanding their home regional base. It 
is also worthy of note that six of the 62 European firms under scrutiny were acquired by other 
firms during the decade (in all but one case at the hands of another firm in the set), and that all 
six were regionally oriented MNEs. This suggests that the regional-level shakeout was already 
underway by the end of the decade.   
Bi-regional and semi-global firms, with their greater geographic scope, were perhaps 
better aware of the uncertainties plaguing the multilateral system at the time and subjected less to 
the expansionary pressures associated with the expectation of an emergent parallel regional-
multilateral institutional environment. To these firms, the apparent dynamism of European 
integration represented a gravitational pull on the geographic scope of their activities. Moreover, 
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the consolidation of the NAFTA as an inward-looking regional integration agreement (see 
below) created tension in bi-regional and semi-global strategies, which are primarily based on 
developing synergies between European and North American activities. As regionalism began to 
supersede multilateralism as the dominant institutional framework, bi-regional and semi-global 
firms were exposed to increasing contractionary pressures.  
Consequently, in two of the four cases (Pechiney and Franz Haniel) European bi-regional 
firms showed a reduction in North American assets and an increase in the share of assets in the 
home region over the 1990s. On the other hand, semi-global European firms (ICI, Philips and 
Electrolux) continued to internationalize marginally outside of Europe, but did so in a relatively 
concentrated fashion instead of pursuing a ‘global’ geographic scope. In most cases additional 
internationalization amounted to consolidation of existing activities in existing locations – a 
primarily defensive strategy. In contrast, the six global European companies managed to increase 
their global dispersion over the decade, suggesting that at the highest levels of 
internationalization, the gravitational effects of regional (and to some extent unilateral) processes 
are less tangible. 
Evidence that the internationalization strategies of European MNEs over the 1990s were 
primarily organized around regionalism suggests that regionalism in Europe was the level of 
institutional development associated with the lowest levels of uncertainty. Moreover, the parallel 
emergence of regionalism in North America seems to have further precipitated a regional 
orientation among European MNEs, and likely reinforced the uncertainty surrounding 
multilateralism. The result appears to have been the emergence of a ‘chasm’ between regional 
strategies and global strategies that represents the institutional uncertainty surrounding the 
parallel development of regional and multilateral institutions.   
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North American strategies: the shift towards regionalism 
Many of the general trends observed among European MNEs are evident among North 
American MNEs as well, in particular the general trend towards increased internationalization 
among the least international firms in 1990, and relatively little internationalization among the 
most internationalized firms. However, some important differences can be identified as well. To 
begin with, more North American firms had a primarily domestic orientation in 1990 (28, or 48 
percent) than their European counterparts (15, or 25 percent). Secondly, while European 
domestically oriented firms in many cases pursued internationalization simultaneously both 
within Europe and without, North American firms tended to opt for the one or the other – and in 
many cases did neither. Five companies (Costco, Wal-Mart, AT&T, GTE and Sears) expanded 
primarily within the NAFTA region, while two companies (GE and ARCO) pursued expansion 
strategies aimed outside of North America. Most striking is that a full 16 firms pursued a ‘stay at 
home’ strategy and hardly internationalized at all. By the end of the decade, however, five of the 
original 28 domestically oriented North American firms had been acquired, in three cases by 
other firms in the sample.  
Largely as a result of the relatively small size of the Canadian and Mexican economies, 
most regionally-oriented North American firms had more extra-regional activity than did 
European regionally-oriented firms to start with. Of the 18 regionally-oriented firms in the US in 
1990, 13 pursued internationalization strategies involving expansion in North America. Of those, 
seven combined regional expansion with expansion outside the home region. Five companies 
reduced their home region positions over the decade, in all but one case in combination with 
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extra-regional expansion. By 2001, three regionally oriented firms had been acquired by or 
merged with other firms (ARCO, Amoco and Chrysler). 
Bi-regional companies, with solidly established bases in North America and Europe, 
show similar patterns as European bi-regional companies. In contrast to the expansionist 
tendencies of regionally oriented firms (and to a lesser extent domestically oriented firms), bi-
regional North American MNEs showed a marked reduction in the scope of their extra-
regionality, with only one exception (Dow Chemical). In contrast, three of the four semi-global 
MNEs continued to expand extra-regionally, targeting in particular Asia. The three global MNEs 
did not show any clear tendencies, with data clouded by the merger between two of the three 
(Exxon and Mobil). However, both ExxonMobil and the other remaining global North American 
MNE (Coca-Cola) showed lower levels of extra-regional activity in 2001 than in 1990, 
indicating overall a modest relative contraction. 
 
Overview 
The palette of diverse strategies pursued by Triad firms over the 1990s is shown in Figure 
3. The axes of the diagram run in two directions from the center, representing either intra- or 
extra-regional contraction or expansion, respectively. The center of each axis, and thus the center 
of the diagram, represents ‘no change’ in one direction or the other. From that point, firms can 
migrate in four general directions: global expansion, which includes internationalization both 
inside and outside the home region; regional expansion, which involves an increased focus solely 
on the home region; regional escape, by which internationalization occurs outside the home 
region; and retreat, involving contraction across both dimensions.  
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Figure 3 shows on the one hand that many Japanese and North American firms remained 
primarily domestically oriented even into the new millennium. On the other, many domestic and 
regional firms embarked on global expansionist trajectories, combining growth within the region 
and growth without. More fundamentally, Figure 3 shows that the MNEs with the highest levels 
of internationalization in 1990 in general experienced contraction over one or, in some cases, 
both dimensions, suggesting that a general ‘globalization push’ has not occurred since 1990. 
Rather a complex mix of strategic migrations has taken place that mirrors shifts in institutional 
emphasis in different geographic spaces over the decade, as well as differences in perceptions of 
the institutional environment by firms at different levels of internationalization. The evidence 
indicates that highly internationalized firms were better able to use their geographic scope to 
assess the real developments in the institutional environment over the 1990s, while domestic and 
regional firms may have generated a ‘bandwagon effect’ as a result of the globalization hype. 
 
FIGURE 3 about here 
 
As a final example of how firm strategies mirror the institutional environment in which 
they operate, it should be noted that changes in the sample of firms under study occurred over the 
decade in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). In total, 16 firms in the list were 
acquired by others or merged with another firm in the sample (circa ten percent of the total). 
Striking is that in Europe, the wave of mergers all involved firms with a regional orientation. In 
North America, on the other hand, the wave of mergers occurred at the domestic level, with five 
of the ten cases involving domestically oriented firms. Although this pattern is clearly shaped in 
part by changing competition and market consolidation, it must be emphasized that 
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developments in firms’ ‘competitive space’ are inextricably intertwined with developments at the 
politico-institutional level.i 
 
Conclusions 
This paper is aimed at creating nuances in the debate on institutional and economic 
transformation by revealing a considerable degree of institutional and strategic complexity.  By 
addressing three levels of institution building, we have tried to reduce complexity and pinpoint 
some of the tensions that exist between these institutional levels. Moreover, we attempted to 
establish a link between institution building and the strategic reality of MNEs in the form of the 
search for equilibrium, or ‘synergy’ between institutions and international strategy. We explored 
the different geographical orientations of non-financial MNEs from the Triad, and the strategic 
migrations they pursued over the 1990s, to glean insight into the perceptions of MNEs of their 
institutional environment and the pressures to expand or contract the geographic scope of their 
activities in an attempt to improve synergy. 
The evidence from MNE internationalization strategies in the 1990s shows that 
institutional development in the perception of firm strategies was far more complex than is 
suggested by the convergence-divergence debate. The notion of a multilateral, globalized world 
that received so much attention in the academic literature and media in the late 1980s and the 
1990s has been the institutional reality for only a very small number of select firms with a truly 
global strategy. The evidence presented here suggests that to the strategists of the overwhelming 
majority of MNEs from the Triad, strategic reality was shaped most by institution building at the 
regional level, and in many cases Triad firms even saw unilaterally developed institutions as 
strategically most relevant.  
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Just as the past decade and a half paints a complex picture, the future is also likely to be 
plagued by further institutional uncertainties. Will the multilateral system get back on track after 
Cancùn, or does the rise to prominence of some of the world’s larger less-developed countries 
such as Brazil and India within that framework signal a return to unilateralism? Does Europe’s 
expansion into Eastern Europe in May 2004 represent consolidation of a regional sphere, or will 
the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ mentality of many of the new members provide a ‘globalist’ impetus to 
European integration? Or will growing resistance within ‘Old’ Europe to further integration and 
expansion set the tone for a shift from parallel regional multilateralism to conservative 
regionalism? Will the ‘chasm’ continue to grow between the US and Europe which arose through 
parallel regionalism trajectories in the 1990s, and has been exacerbated by political tensions over 
Irak and other issues, as US investors pull out of Europe (Business Week, May 23 2005)?  
Perhaps more profound is the potential shift in institutional development signaled by 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2000. Recent years have witnessed the emergence of China as 
not only a major production powerhouse, but as an up-and-coming buyer of Western MNEs in a 
gambit to acquire technology and local market presence. At the same time speculation continues 
to exist surrounding the emergence of a de facto trading bloc dominated by China in the East. 
The rise of China may be a particular source of uncertainty to the US, and may trigger a 
consolidation of unilateralist tendencies. The one-off growth effects of the NAFTA appear to be 
waning given the erosion of Mexico’s comparative advantage relative to cheap producers in East 
Asia, and the hope of an FTAA has all but faded. Together these complex shifts in the geo-
political landscape exert gravitational pull on MNEs, and will continue to reshape not only the 
institutional environment, but also global competitive spaces. 
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i  Comparable patterns have been observed with respect to the Merger and Acquisition strategies of financial 
services firms like banks throughout the 1990s; the prevailing influence of domestic institutions on firm strategies  - 
and the uncertainty on the exact outlook of international institutions like the Basle Agreement - prompted banks first 
to consolidate in the home market rather than to search for cross-border activities (cf. Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001).  
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Table 1: MNE Strategies 
Geographic 
orientation 
Characteristics Rationale Industries in 1990 
• >90% production and <75% sales in 
home country 
• Security of a large and protected home market; strategic sensitivity (e.g. 
defense industries) 
• Retail; utilities; aerospace; heavy 
industry; automotive; telecom 
Domestic 
 
• May involve a limited geographic diversification strategy based on a large 
protected home market and limited internationalization in protected target 
markets to support local assembly and sales 
• >75% production and sales in home 
region 
• Sufficient size to avoid acquisition; internationalization strategy that avoids 
high agency costs in too many geographically- and culturally distant (extra-
regional) markets  
• Retail; fast-moving consumer 
goods (FMCG); utilities; autos 
and heavy industry; petroleum 
Home 
regional  
 
• Exploitation of comparative advantage (division of labor) across national 
markets on the basis of relatively low transaction costs. Emerged from strong 
historical domestic positions  
• >85% production and sales split across 
two regions 
• Market-driven strategy that emerged in the early- to mid 20th century based on 
growth opportunities in North America and Europe capitalizing on relative 
similarities in market characteristics and growth opportunities 
• Retail; FMCG; computers / 
electronics; chemicals 
Bi-regional   
 
 
Semi-global • ≈50% production in home region; 25% 
in two host regions each (sales may be 
slightly more extra-regional) 
• Near global competitive positioning, particularly in terms of markets, but with 
home region bias in higher value-adding activities such as R&D and skilled 
production 
• Electronics, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals 
Global  
 
• <50% production in home region; 
approaching even split across home 
and two host regions (sales will be 
equally or less extra-regional than 
production) 
• Global competitive positioning by which economies of scale or firm intangible 
assets can be optimally exploited over as large a geographic space as possible 
• FMCG; petroleum 
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Figure 1: Linking institution-building and the geographic scope of MNE strategy 
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Table 2: Emergent issues of MNE strategy under institutional uncertainty 
Geographic 
orientation 
Strategy issues under multi-layered institutional uncertainty 
• How to manage transition from national organization to regional or multilateral environment Domestic 
 • How to protect national production base while exploring potential for geographic expansion under regionalism or multilateralism 
 • Formulation of ‘optimal’ geographic and strategic focus 
• Whether regionalism will create potential for regional synergies  
• How to survive anticipated shake-out 
Home regional  
 
• Whether to consolidate regionally or to use regional platform as a spring-board for extra-regional expansion  
Bi-regional 
 
• Whether regionalism in EU and NAFTA will lead to polarization and create a ‘schism’ in aggregation strategies (based on 
economies of scale) 
• Whether to attempt the leap towards a (semi)global strategy or to consolidate in (bi)regional base 
Semi-global • Whether possibilities for international and inter-regional arbitrage of factor markets will increase or decrease, and thus whether 
production will require increased or decreased dispersion 
Global • Whether possibilities for global aggregation or arbitrage will increase (through multilateralism) or decrease (through regionalism), 
and thus whether integration- and local responsiveness pressures will play out nationally, regionally or globally 
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Figure 2: Examples of shifts in the institutional environment and international strategy 
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Table 3: Strategic migrations of Triad MNEs, 1990-2001 
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